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Current theories of rights tend to rely on metaphysical commitments regarding the consciousness of those capable of having rights. Instrumentalist theories presuppose that those who have rights have interests, and Status theories presuppose that those who have rights have dignity. Both of these claims are most naturally interpreted as implying  that rights bearers have consciousness. Even when a theory deals with the issue of the rights of the permanently unconscious, the impulse is either to respect the fact that a permanently unconscious human is, by being human, of a kind that is supposed to be conscious, or else to couch the unconscious individual’s rights in terms of the rights of others. The unconscious have interests, or dignity, by being one of a class that is essentially (if not always actually) interested, or dignified—and hence, conscious.
The debate over whether digital computers can be conscious is contentious. The day is coming when a machine will be able to pass quite a strong version of the Turing Test, but even this event is not likely to settle the question of Machine consciousness. Current theories of rights, relying as they do on presuppositions about the consciousness of rights bearers, are inadequate to the question of Machine rights until the metaphysical question of Machine consciousness is settled. 
That could take a while.
But I am going to offer an argument that certain Machines have rights, and that we can know this without knowing whether these Machines have consciousness or not. I will not offer a new theory of rights. Rather, the conclusion of my argument can be taken as a desideratum on any correct theory of rights. As I will argue, we know already that these Machines have rights (if humans do). This is a fact that any correct theory of rights will have to take as a datum.
Which rights? In this paper, I will not specify any particular rights. My argument is that Machines have rights, and that is the extent of my claim. It will be seen from the way I argue for this claim that these rights are closely analogous to certain rights that humans have, but I won’t say more than that here. It’s important enough already simply to have established that they have some rights or other.




Contribution By Virtue Of: X has Y to contribute by virtue of interaction Z iff Y is the difference that would be made by X’s participation in Z.

Social Interaction: An interaction concerning which all the interactors have interests, in which the actions of the interactors are guided by these interests, and in which at least one of the interactors modifies her own pursuit of her interests concerning the interaction based on her knowledge of the interests (concerning the interaction) of the other interactors.
	
Quasi-Social Interaction: An interaction which is indistinguishable from a social interaction except,if it is not a social interaction, by reference to the fact that one or more interactor has no interests. (It is a consequence of this definition that all social interactions are also quasi-social interactions, but not vice versa.)

Non-opinionated operator: An operator of a machine who brings to the table no preconceptions about how machines, as a class, ought to be treated.
	
Strong Turing Test Capable Machine (an STTCM): A non-human machine which can reliably make non-opinionated operators think it best to interact with the machine socially, however strangely shaped or composed such a social agent might have been. Another term I will use for an STTCM is simply, “Machine.”

The Argument Of This Paper

STTCMs have rights irrespective to whether they are sentient or not. If something can pass a strong enough Turing Test, it has rights—whether it is a conscious agent or not. Even if STTCMs aren’t actually persons (metaphysically speaking), they still have rights.
Here is a summary of my argument for this claim. The first line needs substantial support, so it is not yet convincing. This is just to show the shape of the argument.

1)	If there are quasi-social non-social interactors, then they have rights.
2)	If all quasi-social interactors are social interactors, then they have rights.
3)	Either there is a quasi-social non-social interactor, or all quasi-social interactors are social interactors.
4)	All quasi-social interactors have rights.
5)	STTCMs are quasi-social interactors.
6)	STTCMs have rights.





Here is the argument for line 1. The justifications for each line will be given in subsequent passages.

1.1) The decision whether to do X should turn on the difference it makes whether X is done or not.
1.2) So, the decision whether to treat a thing as though it has rights should turn on the difference it makes whether the thing is treated as though it has rights or not.
1.3) Suppose: Some things are capable of quasi-social interaction that is not social interaction.
1.4) Something (‘M’) capable of non-social quasi-social interaction can be treated as though it has rights.
1.5) If M has the same thing to contribute by virtue of being treated as though it has rights as a human being would, then if the human being should be treated as though it has rights, M should as well.
1.6) M has the same thing to contribute by virtue of being treated as though it has rights as a human being would.
1.7) All human beings should be treated as though they have rights.
1.8) M should be treated as though it has rights.
1.9)  If a thing should be treated as though it has rights, then it has rights.
1.10) M has rights.

Line 1.1 I take to be a truism. Line 1.2 follows trivially from 1.1. Line1.5 follows from 1.2 and the definition of “contribution by virtue of” given above. Line 1.7 is an assumption I expect is shared by every reader of this paper. Line 1.8 follows from lines 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7. Line 1.10 follows from 1.8 and 1.9. And line 1 follows from line 1.3 and line 1.10. This leaves unjustified lines 1.4, 1.6, and 1.9. I will now proceed to justify those three lines.
	Line 1.4 is justified by the following line of reasoning. Since M, an STTCM, is a quasi-social non-social interactor, it can reliably and sustainedly interact with humans in a way that is just like a social interaction, distinguishable from social only by reference to M’s metaphysical status as a non-interested entity. Since it interacts with humans in a way that is just like social interaction, for any social interaction we might have entered into with a human, we can interact with M in a way that is just like that (in the sense that the interaction will seem to us as if we are engaging in an equivalent genuinely social interaction). Since we can treat humans as though they have rights, then, and since this is a social interaction in the case of humans, we can also treat M as though it has rights, though in this case it would be a quasi-social and not a social interaction.
Now to explain the justification for line 1.6. When M is treated as though it has rights, it responds in a certain way (a way which varies according to its quasi-personality and its quasi-needs and so on, just as with humans). How it responds is what it has to contribute by virtue of being treated as though it has rights. And since M is an STTCM being quasi-socially interacted with, how M would respond to this interaction is the same as how a human would respond. Things like M, then, have the same thing to contribute by virtue of being treated as though they rights as humans do.
	Of course since M might be very different, physically speaking, from any human being, the physical outcome of interactions which are as though it has rights might be quite different from the physical outcome of interactions which are as though humans have rights. For example, perhaps humans have a basic right to breathe, but M doesn’t breathe, so that treating M as though M had a right to breathe would result in a very different outcome.  And perhaps treating M as though M has rights involves doing our best to make sure M has access to batteries, but to treat a human in the same way would result in a very different situation since humans don’t use batteries in the same way.
	This seems easily answered by pointing out that treating M as though it has rights does not amount to treating M as though it were a biologically normal human being. It does not involve assuring M of access to air in the same way we should make sure humans have access to air. M doesn’t need it. Similarly, treating a human as though he has rights doesn’t involve assuring him access to batteries as it does for M. The human doesn’t need them (in the same way). 
	But the objection can be put another way. Since M doesn’t breathe, M will not respond to being treated as though it has rights by breathing. A human will. This means they respond differently, and so have different things to contribute by virtue of being treated this way. To put it even more starkly, most pairs of humans will respond differently to being treated this way, if only because of differences in personality and needs. So then, was I wrong to say above that “how M would respond to this interaction is the same as how a human would respond”?
	No, for I said M would respond in the same way because “M is an STTCM interacting quasi-socially.” The claim isn’t that interaction with M is indistinguishable from interaction with a human being. Rather, the claim is that quasi-social interaction with M is indistinguishable from social interaction with a human, qua (quasi-)social. 
Humans come in various shapes, have various histories, and are even in some cases composed differently from each other. But whatever differences there may be between a pair of humans, their social interactions with you will share a certain character—a social character. As things currently stand, we would generally take this to be a result of the fact that the two are of a kind, both being a member of the species Homo Sapiens. But quasi-social interactions with M also share this character. M can be distinguished from human by its shape, composition, or history. But it can’t be distinguished from human by the character of our quasi-social interactions with it. Whatever M’s shape, composition or history, there is something about the way it responds to such treatment which is the same as the way a human responds to such treatment. Though M may not be capable of social interaction, nevertheless M’s interactions with humans have a social character—the same character had by social interactions between humans.
As I’ve said, the decision whether to do something should be based on the difference it makes whether the thing is done or not. But not every single result is a relevant part of the difference made. If I am sorting apples by color, then the difference made by an apple’s worminess is not relevant to my decision as to which bucket to put an apple in. Similarly, the difference made by the shapes, compositions or histories of humans is not relevant to the decision whether to treat them as though they have rights. Rather, as I’ve intimated, what will be relevant are differences made by their ability to respond in a way that has a social character. 
For nothing is relevant to the decision whether to treat humans as though they have rights except what arises from the way that humans have interests. But within the scope of a social interaction (such as treating someone as though they have rights) nothing arises from the way they have interests except what results from their ability to respond in a way that has a social character. (If something arises from their pursuit of interests that don’t concern the interaction, then it doesn’t arise from the way they have interests within the scope of the interaction. And the pursuit of those interests of theirs that do concern the interaction is what the ability to respond in a way that has a social character consists in.) 
But with respect to the ability to respond in a way that has a social character, M is no different from a human being. So then, with respect to what is relevant to the decision whether to treat something as though it has rights, M would respond to that treatment in the same way that a human would. Therefore M has the same thing to contribute by virtue of such treatment.
Now here is how I argue for line 1.8. The idea is fairly simple. If we should treat something as though it were X in most cases but not all cases, then it would not be X. But if we should treat it as though it were X in all cases, then for all intents and purposes—and those are all the intents and purposes there are!—it would be X. It is practically contradictory to say “We must always treat it as though it were X, but it is not X!” not least because by saying it’s not X, we’re failing to treat it as though it were X.
	So it goes with things’ being treated as though they have rights. If we should treat a thing as though it has rights in all cases, then in fact, it has rights. (Though above I have acknowledged that traditionally, rights are had by things with interests, I am here registering disagreement with that tradition.) I have argued that M should be treated as though it has rights, and the argument hasn’t implied any exception to that claim. Hence, what I have argued for implies that M not only should be treated as though it has rights, but has rights.
	That is my argument. Granting my arguments for 1.4, 1.6 and 1.8, all else follows. Machines have rights, and it doesn’t matter whether they are sentient or not. They have rights simply because they have the same thing to contribute that humans do, relevantly speaking; namely the particular kind of quasi-social interactive capabilities that make them able to pass a strong version of the Turing Test.
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^1	  The question of Machine Rights has been dealt with in numerous works of science fiction, a classic example being Bicentennial Man by Isaac Asimov. (1976) However, It is usual for these works to assume that the Machines in question have some kind of consciousness. Meanwhile, no philosopher has seriously dealt with the question of Machine rights. In an article on Artificial Intelligence in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Larry Hauser does ask, “…[I]f general human-level behavioral abilities ever were achieved…would that really be thinking? Would human-level robots be owed human-level moral rights and owe human-level moral obligations?” He leaves the question unanswered, but notice he implies the answer depends on whether the Machines involved are “really thinking” or not. It should further be noted that Putnam (1975: 407), in an argument about Machine consciousness, concluded that we cannot discover whether they are conscious but can only decide whether they are, and advocated for a decision in favor of their being conscious based on a disapproval of certain kinds of discrimination. There is a similarity here to what I want to do, since he argues for a claim about the status of Machines that can be made independently of any prior fact about their status as conscious beings. And by using the loaded term “discrimination” he seems to make the decision whether Machines are question seem akin to a question of Machine Rights. But strictly speaking, he does not mean “discrimination” in this political sense, even if he is clearly tapping into its political connotations. In any case, Putnam’s argument is that Machines are conscious, not that they have rights. My argument is that they have rights, whether or not they are conscious.
